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In 1999 two young Arab kings succeeded their fa-
thers to the throne: King Hussein of Jordan had
reigned for 46 years and King Hassan of Morocco for
38 years, when their eldest sons, Abdullah and Mo-
hammed (both born in the first half of the 60s) suc-
ceeded them. The new kings have a European educa-
tion and distinctly westernized behaviour. It is for
this reason that many observers were expecting a le-
gitimacy crisis. But thus far, the two monarchs seem
to propose a different conception of political order
which has gained widespread support: they are re-
garded as the new heralds of Moroccan and Jordan-
ian youth. The support of the youth is one of the
major challenges in societies where more than half of
the population is under 25 years of age.
T r a n s f o r m a t i o n
through Monarchy
in Morocco and Jordan
The new kings of Morocco and Jordan both
benefit on the national level from the inher-
ited royal legitimation, on the international
level from the support of the Clinton-ad-
ministration and on the personal level from
an effort to introduce a new concept of au-
thority. The rumour that King Abdullah
went around the country in disguise talking
to people in a government hospital or in the
bureaucracy in order to avoid being isolated
from the complaints of the masses is not un-
substantiated. Mohammed VI is called by
teenagers ÕM 6Õ or ÔKing of the PoorÕ. In 1987
he received his diploma in political science
from the University of Rabat. Six years later
he submitted his doctoral thesis at the Uni-
versity of Nice on the cooperation between
the Maghreb and the European Union.
Meanwhile he accompanied Jacques Delors,
in his capacity as President of the European
Commission, for eight months in order to
learn EU diplomatic policy making. Contrary
to many comments after the death of his fa-
ther, Mohammed VI was prepared to suc-
ceed him but did not play an important
public role within the court ceremony nor
had he voiced any political opinions prior.
What was formally known as the Ôreign of
h i b aÕ (fear) is now being transplanted by a
wave of trust.
New values or better public
r e l a t i o n s ?
It is too early to evaluate the sustainability
of the introduction of new norms and values
and the direct influence of this discourse on
R e a l p o l i t i k. It was, without a doubt, a coura-
geous act when Mohammed VI ousted long-
term Minister of Interior, Driss Basri, after 25
years. This event supports the hypothesis
that the more humble behaviour of the
heads of states and a new etiquette at the
royal palaces is not merely a masquerade or
political tactics. Further research is neces-
sary, however, to analyse the effectiveness
of the changing images of Mohammed VI
and Abdullah II in order to assess their influ-
ence on the collective cultural identity.
One important historical study on Moroc-
co has been presented by Abdellah Ham-
moudi, who has examined Ôthe exact ways
in which these abstract principles of legiti-
mation are vested with an emotional impact
sufficient to foster actionÕ (Hammoudi 1997:
2). The author looked at the ideological and
cultural foundations of the persistent au-
thoritarianism from an anthropological
point of view. From a political science ap-
proach, new questions arise in order to ex-
plore whether and how the images of both
kings foster legitimacy among the youth. It
needs to be assessed whether and how Mo-
hammed VI can still be the sacred comman-
der of the faithful and at the same time
break through the authoritarian style of
rule. The recent web chats among Moroc-
cans that have appeared Ð with the
anonymity of the Internet Ð containing
questions about the possibility that a de-
scendant of the Prophet be gay, show the
sensitivity of this debate.
Hassan II: the last king of
divine right in Morocco?
The relationship between the Moroccan
king and his subjects is one of direct alle-
giance. The televised ceremony of alle-
giance, performed every year on March 3,
equals the submission of the whole popula-
tion in one instant. The monarchy becomes
the one point of reference for the vast ma-
jority of Moroccans. The opposition journal-
ist Hamid Berrada pointed out that when
the people mourned the loss of their father
in July 1999 this was not a metaphor; they
had been literally turned into orphans. The
strength of the monarchy lies in its direct re-
ligious ties between the king-sultan-caliph
and the subject-believer-citizen. Ô[A]ttack-
ing him would be both a crime and a sacri-
lege Ð inseparable notions in this logic Ð at
once a violation of divine law and the de-
sacralization of a figure of Islamic pietyÕ,
notes Hammoudi (1997: 13). The identifica-
tion with the leader is not only based on di-
vine authority and sharifian descent, but
also derived from the anti-colonial stance of
the monarchy. Due to Moroccan colonial
history, identification with the regime is
much greater than in any other Arab coun-
t r y .
What constitutes legitimacy?
The point of departure here is the as-
sumption that religious conceptions of
order and legitimacy do not only have a
dogmatic dimension but are also part of a
changing social praxis. Legitimacy is not un-
derstood as an inherent characteristic of
monarchical rule as such, but as the result of
a process of bargaining and counterbalanc-
ing. The Alawite dynasty that has ruled Mo-
rocco since the 17t h century has relied on
very flexible conceptions of order and legit-
imacy, which partly explains their continu-
ous and stable rule. The MakhzenÕs (literally
ÔstorehouseÕ Ð centre of power, state) strate-
gy to counterbalance urban and tribal soci-
ety, Arab and Berber, and reformers and the
orthodoxy, has a long successful history in
M o r o c c o .
The sacralization of the monarchy in the
post-colonial constitution of 1962 (Art. 23)
can be seen as one example of the (re-)con-
struction of religiously founded concep-
tions of political legitimacy in contemporary
Morocco. The constitution, originally a secu-
lar instrument, now establishes the sacred-
ness of the person of the king Ð an idea
completely alien to classical Islamic law.
Hereditary monarchy is another concept
that is highly controversial among Muslim
scholars. Even the ceremony of the b a yca
(oath of allegiance to the sultan/king) does
not mean a return to Muslim traditions, but
is very much a backward production. Today
high officials from the Ministry of Interior
and members of parliament are swearing al-
legiance Ð and the ulema as well. The com-
bination of traditional form with modern
content is supposed to constitute historical
continuity and therefore legitimacy.
A new challenge for Islamist
opposition groups
Whereas their fathers had been proponents
of an authoritarian cultural symbolism, their
young successors depict themselves as citi-
zens among citizens. The mosque of Hassan II
in Casablanca is an architectural manifesta-
tion of the former tradition-bound authority
(see ISIM Newsletter 3/99). In Morocco, streets
and public buildings are either named after
Hassan II or Mohammed V but never after or-
dinary citizens. Mohammed VI is still consid-
ered to be a direct successor of the prophet in
the 36th generation. This line of legitimation is
not being erased now, but is mixed with ele-
ments of modern popular culture.
The young kingÕs new semiology repre-
sents a cultural re-evaluation in the Middle
East. It is being debated whether the obvious
metamorphosis of the holy will end in a posi-
tion of the king comparable to the Spanish
monarch after Franco. Or is Mohammed VI
just trying to secure the position of the crown
above the constitution by applying a modern
outlook?
In both cases, the new symbolism means a
different challenge for the Islamist opposition
than the types of regime with which they
were formerly confronted. So far they had
presented themselves as the Ôvoice of the
poorÕ. Faced with a choice, many young peo-
ple now prefer the cosmopolitan outlook of
their young leader to the inward looking
worldview of the Islamists who demand not
to listen to music or to separate the sexes.
The importance and profundity of certain
actions can best be deciphered by the reac-
tions they call forth: In November 1999, Ab-
dessalam Yassine, the leader of the most im-
portant Moroccan Islamist group al-cAdl wal-
Ihsan (Justice and Welfare) wrote a remark-
able letter addressing Mohammed VI. Yassine
depicts the young monarch as highly ad-
mired by Moroccan youth. Ô[They] regard him
as a friend, a symbol of liberation and a
promise for a better future. During the first
weeks of his reign, and wherever his inaugur-
al campaign took him, the young king is
greeted with genuine and youthful enthusi-
asm. The Makhzen machinery, which organ-
ised the funeral of the late Hassan II, plays a
full role to present to the crowd, overcome
with cheers, a young man having great pres-
ence, smiling and gesturing benevolently to
the warm welcome of the public.Õ *
Despite YassineÕs proposal to repatriate the
royal familyÕs fortune in order to reduce Mo-
roccoÕs foreign debt, poverty and the unem-
ployment rate Ð a proposal considered offen-
sive by the king and therefore censured Ð Yas-
sine in his letter does not suggest that Mo-
hammed VI is not to be trusted or that his mis-
sion has already failed. ÔIn this beginning of
November 1999, the young king has won the
first round in his glorious battle against ÒlÕem-
pire du malÓ. He has dismissed the central pil-
lar of the Makhzen. HassanÕs odd-job man.
HassanÕs right-hand man. Public enemy 2É
In his speeches, the new king talks about a
Ònew concept of authorityÓ. He has brilliantly
proven that he intends to act accordingly.
However, does he really intend to break off
with the past? Can he do so? When is the
great revolution to take place?Õ (Yassine:
1999)
The old generation of leaders in the Middle
East chose to counter the growing tide of Is-
lamism with more and more public space for
a paternalistic interpretation of what were
deemed to be Muslim traditions and prac-
tices. With the death of Hassan II, many ob-
servers doubted whether Mohammed VI
would acquire the spiritual authority as com-
mander of the faithful and the theological au-
thority as highest religious scholar that would
guarantee him the support of the ulema. Now
it seems that this might not even be his
strongest asset against the Islamist opposi-
tion. It will be of interest for the whole Arab
world to see which notions of legitimacy and
type of power will be put forward in a society
which is heavily struck by a crisis of religious
and political meaning. '
N o t e
* Yassine explained that he had originally written
the Memorandum in French in order to reach
MoroccoÕs westernized French-speaking elite who
regard Arabic as a ÔÓvernacularÓ language used
only to communicate with illiterate people.Õ
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